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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter as a 
domestic relations matter, pursuant to UCA 78a-2a-3(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Issue: Was the trial court correct in overturning the 
prior negotiated QDRO of the parties without a compelling reason or 
even a change of circumstances? 
Standard of Review: A stipulated order negotiated with 
the aid of counsel and reviewed and approved by the court should 
not be lightly over turned but only for compelling reasons. Land 
v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 
1359 (Utah 1974). The conclusions of law may be assessed for 
correctness without deference to the trial court. State v. Rio 
Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
To upset a prior divorce decree a change of circumstance must 
be found. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978). A 
stipulated settlement is not to be lightly overturned. A decree 
can not be changed just because one of the parties now regrets the 
decision. Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, (Utah 1980). The reason to 
change a stipulated, reviewed order must be compelling and not just 
because one party is upset about value. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
a. The parties were divorced in 1985. The divorce 
decree provides for a division of the retirement benefits of the 
parties, ( See Divorce Decree of December 16, 1985.) 
b. In 1986 the parties by stipulation modified the 
retirement provisions of the divorce decree.(See Stipulation and 
Order In Re Modification of Decree of January 8, 1986.) 
c. The Civil Service Office of Personnel Management, 
announced the termination of participants right to take part of 
their retirement as a lump sum prior to receiving regular monthly 
payments. Retirees had to actually retire before December 1, 1990 
or else lose the right to take the lump sum option. Mr. Montgomery 
determined that he desired to take the lump sum option. (Transcript 
Page 21 Line 21.) 
d. In October of 1989 Mr. Montgomery approached Mrs. 
Montgomery about both of them agreeing to allow the other to take 
their retirement partially through a lump sum. Mrs. Montgomery 
informed him she had already taken her retirement, but agreed to 
allow him the same right. She signed a document (Defendant's 
Exhibit 1) consenting that Mr. Montgomery take a portion of his 
retirement using the lump sum option prior to receiving monthly 
payments. (Transcript Page 28 Line 15; Page 12 Line 24.) 
e. Mr. Montgomery informed Mrs. Montgomery that if she 
did not agree to his taking a partial lump sum portion of his 
retirement he could not retire at that time. He informed her that 
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he would have to work approximately 10 additional years before 
retiring in order to earn enough additional retirement benefits to 
pay her the $400 a month previously ordered if he was going to keep 
the standard of living he wanted in retirement. (Transcript Page 24 
Line 8ff; Page 8 Line 18ff; Page 34 Line 19-24.) 
f. Mr. Montgomery filed the documents requesting 
retirement and the payment of his lump sum as part of his 
retirement benefits. He was informed by Civil Service that the 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order on file would have to be 
modified before his request could be granted. (Transcript Page 23 
Line 15.) 
g. In the summer of 1990 the parties through counsel 
began negotiation of a stipulation to modify the existing QDRO. 
The parties had no direct contact except through counsel. 
(Transcript Page 9 Line 8.) 
h. Mr. Montgomery never told the former Mrs. Montgomery 
that if she accepted a portion of the lump sum that Mr. Montgomery 
would receive no further retirement benefits. The former Mrs. 
Montgomery upon advice of her counsel and after her independent 
investigation of her rights opted to execute the stipulation that 
became the basis of the court's order modifying the Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order. (Transcript Page 11 to Page 13.) 
i. Mr. Montgomery retired and processed his claim for 
benefits in accordance with the QDRO agreed upon by the parties and 
reduced to an order by the court. 
j. Mrs. Snitchler shortly thereafter informed Civil 
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Service that the lump sum retirement benefit should not be allowed. 
The lump sum was only recently partially received by Mr. 
Montgomery. He has tendered to Mrs. Montgomery her portion of the 
retirement benefits under the lump sum. She has refused to accept 
it. (Transcript Page 38 Line 8.) 
k. Mr. Montgomery cannot go back to work and lacks the 
income to live on if required to now pay his former spouse $400.00 
per month. Mr. Montgomery relied to his detriment on Mrs. 
Montgomery's execution of the stipulation and order. He retired 
based upon the order. He cannot now get his job back. He has 
planned his retirement on the income he negotiated to receive. 
(Transcript Page 24 Line 8ff.) 
1. Mrs. Montgomery brought the present action to modify 
the QDRO to give her monthly benefits. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
An order for retirement was negotiated. The proposition 
presented to Mrs. Snitchler was accept a portion of the partial 
lump sum payment now or Mr. Montgomery must wait about ten years to 
accumulate enough retirement benefits to achieve the standard of 
living for retirement he wants. 
There is no substantial change of circumstance, there is no 
compelling reason to overturn a stipulated decree. 
POINT II 
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There was no misrepresentation. A misrepresentation is an act 
of untruth or concealment. Mrs. Snitchler acted on the advice of 
her counsel after her own independent investigation. Neither Mrs. 
Snitchler nor her counsel say they relied on Mr. Montgomery or his 
counsel. 
Mrs. Snitchler chose some money now rather than wait for a 
monthly income stream in the future. There is no evidence that Mr. 
Montgomery misrepresented anything to her. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERTURNING A STIPULATED ORDER. 
The fundamental, telling fact of the present case is that the 
parties entered a voluntary stipulation negotiated through counsel 
that was received and approved by the court. The parties in the 
present case never spoke with each other after October of 1989. 
All of the negotiations that took place from September through 
November of 1990 were done through the parties respective counsel. 
The general rule is that once a matter is litigated and 
resolved it is res judicata. The court in Land v Land 605 P.2d 
1248 (Utah 1980) after observing that the rules of equity apply to 
divorce matters said: 
when a decree is based upon a property 
agreementf forged by the parties and sanctioned by the 
court, equity must take such agreement into 
consideration. Equity is not available to reinstate 
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply 
because one has come to regret the bargain made. 
Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction 
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of the court where a property settlement has been 
incorporated into the decree, and the outright abrogation 
of the provisions of such an agreement is only to be 
resorted to with great reluctance and for compelling 
reasons. (Citations deleted.) 
The Utah Court has consistently said a finality must be given 
to matters previously settled. In the present case there is a 
stipulation entered by the parties. The stipulation contains 
specific language that this is a final and complete resolution of 
all matters relating to retirement between the parties. Mrs. 
Snitchler knew and understood that this was the intent of the 
stipulation. (Transcript Page 33 Line 22 to Page 34 Line 9.) 
The initial proposed stipulation presented to Mrs. Snitchler 
for her consideration, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, essentially gave the 
lump sum amount to Mr. Montgomery and gave Mrs. Snitchler her 
approximately $400.00 per month. The stipulation accepted by Mrs. 
Snitchler waives her right in the monthly payments and grants her 
a percentage in the partial lump sum. There was no 
misunderstanding of the import or intent of the stipulation. Both 
Mrs. Snitchler and her counsel understood the two options. 
(Transcript Page 14 Line 10 - 18.) 
Nothing has changed in the circumstances of the parties since 
the entry of the new QDRO. The full effect and intent of the 
stipulation was carried out. Mr. Montgomery retired based upon the 
stipulation. There must be some change of circumstance to justify 
a modification. 
The Utah Supreme Court strongly stated the necessity of a 
change of circumstance in Kessimakis v Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090 
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(Utah 1978). 
This Court is clearly committed to the proposition 
that in order to modify a prior decree the moving party 
must show a substantial change in circumstance. In the 
absence of such a showing, the decree shall not be 
modified and the matters previously litigated and 
incorporated therein cannot be collaterally attacked in 
face of the doctrine of res judicata. Consequently, 
[the] attempt to challenge the equity of the original 
decree cannot be tolerated. 
In the present case the stipulation and the subsequent order 
did exactly what the parties anticipated it would. Mrs. Snitchler 
was entitled to exactly what she bargained for. But for, her own 
complaint to the Office of Personnel Management and her subsequent 
dissatisfaction with the bargain she struck she would have received 
exactly what she was promised. (Transcript Page 38 Line 8.) 
When Mr. Montgomery finally received his lump sum payment he 
tendered the 27% amount as agreed. Mrs. Snitchler has and is 
still refusing to take the payment. (Transcript Page 6 Line 25 to 
Page 7 Line 2; Page 38 Line 15.) 
Mrs. Snitchler had no obligation to sign the stipulation and 
allow Mr. Montgomery to retire and take the partial lump sum 
retirement option. Mr. Montgomery in 1989 had explained to her 
and as did his counsel later through Mr. Kunz that Montgomery would 
not retire early if he had to pay $400.00 per month. The choice 
presented to Mrs. Snitchler was take a lump sum now or wait perhaps 
as many as ten years to receive anything. There was an extreme 
time dead line. If the papers were not completed by November 30, 
1990 the option was gone forever. She chose to sign the 
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stipulation and take a portion of the lump sum and waive any right 
to the monthly payments. (Transcript Page 36 Line 18 to Page 37 
Line 1.) 
Nothing has changed since the parties negotiated the new order 
except Mrs. Snitchler has become dissatisfied with her bargain. 
She now wants to go back and get more after Mr. Montgomery has 
irretrievably altered his position by retiring in reliance on the 
order agreed to by the parties. 
It would be unjust in the extreme to allow Mrs. Snitchler to 
go back on her word. The plain language of the stipulation and 
order waives any right to future monthly payments. Both she and 
her attorney understood that was the meaning of the documents. She 
got exactly what she bargained for. 
This is a case where the parties entered a stipulation that 
was negotiated by counsel and approved by the court. Its full, 
understood intent was carried out. Mrs. Snitchler wants a 
modification simply because of dissatisfaction with the amount of 
money. She understands that if she can get a percentage of the 
monthly payments in an amount of $400.00 per month rather than a 
percentage of the lump sum she is likely to make much more from the 
labor of her ex-husband. The difficulty is that Montgomery retired 
now, only because of her inducement to limit what she received to 
a percentage of the lump sum. 
The reason to change a stipulated, court reviewed and approved 
order must be compelling and not just because one party is upset 
about value. Mitchell v Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). 
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When the parties have had the opportunity to have a determination 
of their issues then they become res judicata. The doctrine also 
applies to divorce decrees. Jacobson v Jacobson, 703 P.2d 303 
(Utah 1985). 
It should also be noted that no where in the court's ruling do 
the words "substantial change of circumstance" occur. (Transcript 
Page 46 Line 23 to Page 52.) 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO MISREPRESENTATION. 
The trial court found that Mr. Montgomery misrepresented the 
facts to his ex-wife. The trial court hangs the whole modification 
on a misrepresentation. The court states its finding as follows: 
And I think in that process, the defendant 
deliberately misrepresented to both — to the plaintiff 
what the benefit was, and never at any time was it 
conveyed to the plaintiff what the actual entitlement 
was, that is, that there was a lump sum payment of the 
29,774 plus the $1776 per month. Apparently that's not 
even determined until March 14th, 1991 when Mr. 
Montgomery signs the document at that time agreeing that 
that's what he is to receive. (Transcript Page 49 Line 
15-22.) 
It is hard to imagine how the trial court reached the 
conclusion that Mr. Montgomery misrepresented anything to his ex-
wife. The court focuses on the problem. How could the defendant 
misrepresent something in October of 1989 when he was not even 
informed until March 14, 1991. 
When pressed for what the misrepresentation was, the court 
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responded, 
The misrepresentation goes clear back to the time on 
October 10th of 1990 when they were signing the agreement 
where the representation was that the total retirement 
was $29,774. And that was a total lump sum settlement. 
And so she had a 20 — in effect, a certain percentage of 
that. and that was a misrepresentation. All right. 
That's all. (Transcript Page 51 Line 20 to Page 52 Line 
1.) 
This makes no sense. In October of 1989 they met to each sign 
the necessary papers for the other to take the partial lump sum 
retirement option. Mrs. Snitchler signed the paper and informed 
Mr. Montgomery that she had already obtained hers without his 
signature. Defendant's Exhibit 1 is the document she signed. 
There is nothing arcane or obscure about it. It is the request for 
retirement that every Civil Service employee including Mrs. 
Snitchler had to sign. 
The Office of Personnel Management sent back Mr. Montgomery's 
request with the statement that there was an existing Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order that had to be modified first before 
Montgomery could be allowed the partial lump sum option. 
(Transcript Page 23 Line 15 - 19.) 
No where does Mrs. Snitchler's make the allegation that Mr. 
Montgomery told her that the partial lump sum was all the 
retirement she would receive. There is no evidence for the court's 
finding of a misrepresentation. She affirmatively states what the 
October 1989 government document was for. "The reason for this 
paper was that he could receive his lump sum just as I, and there 
was no other comments." (Transcript Page 32 Line 2-3.) 
The misrepresentation was said to begin at the meeting in 
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front of the notary when the parties were to sign each other's 
documents for the partial lump sum distribution. Mrs. Snitchler 
informed Montgomery that he did not have to sign because she 
already had her lump sum. (Transcript Page 31 Line 1-8.) After 
that time the parties had no further conversations. 
Mrs. Snitchler thereafter only communicated with her ex-
husband through counsel. She made her decision as to whether or 
not to sign a new QDRO based upon her consultations with her 
attorney. Neither Mrs. Snitchler nor her counsel relied on Mr. 
Montgomery nor his counsel for any understanding of anything. The 
stipulation its self clearly says that she will not receive 
anything from the future monthly payments. She admits to 
understanding this fact as well. (Transcript Page 12 Line 24 to 
Page 13 Line 1.) 
It is hard to believe that she did not understand that Mr. 
Montgomery was going to receive a monthly amount for retirement in 
addition to the lump sum annuity. She had only recently gone 
through the same retirement process. (Transcript Page 31 Line 1 -
8.) 
Mrs. Snitchler never makes the allegation that Mr. Montgomery 
told her anything one way or the other. These people simply did 
not talk. It cannot be claimed that the misrepresentation was made 
vicariously through counsel. Mrs. Snitchler relied on her own 
counsel who made his own independent investigation of the facts and 
advised her accordingly. (Transcript Page 10 Line 13 to Page 13 
Line 4.) 
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Not even Mr. Kunz claims to having received false or 
misleading information from opposing counsel. So where is the 
misrepresentation. The strongest statement made by Mr. Kunz, is 
that "after that conversation (with government retirement officers) 
that I had a brief conversation with Mr. Hughes wherein I think I 
informed him of the information I had received from Washington." 
(Transcript Page 12 Line 8 - 11.) 
Mrs. Snitchler had at her command all of her own retirement 
package, which would have included Defendant's Exhibit 1, anything 
she cared to request from the Hill Air Force Base Personnel Office, 
anything she cared to request from the Civil Service Office of 
Personnel Management, any advice she cared to request from her 
counsel. The source of the information upon which Mr. Kunz relied 
in giving his advice was Washington. "[A]nd that stipulation was 
prepared in accordance with the information that Washington had 
provided me..." (Transcript Page 13 Line 8.) How can it be said 
Mr. Montgomery misrepresented anything to her? The stipulation in 
unmistakable terms states that Mrs. Snitchler by signing the 
stipulation waives all rights in any and all annuities or monthly 
payments. It is important to note that no where is there language 
in the stipulation that would lead to the conclusion that Mr. 
Montgomery was not going to get regular monthly payments. 
The ultimate decision to sign and induce Mr. Montgomery to 
take an early retirement was Mrs. Snitchler's. Mrs. Snitchler had 
an absolute right not to sign the stipulation. Had she chosen not 
to, the pre-existing QDRO would have remained in force and effect. 
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The difference would have been that Mr. Montgomery would have 
continued working and accumulating retirement benefits until his 
retirement would have reached a level on which he felt he could 
retire comfortably and still pay his ex. Had she decided the 
monthly payment of approximately $400.00 per month was more 
important than getting her share of the partial lump sum now she 
could have simply not signed the stipulation. 
Mrs. Snitchler is trying to get the best of both worlds at Mr. 
Montgomery's expense. She would not have received retirement 
benefits now unless she agreed to the stipulation. If there has 
been a misrepresentation it is Mrs. Snitchler. She promised a 
division of the retirement benefit and got counsel and the court as 
well as Mr. Montgomery to go along. Now she wants to rescind her 
promise after Mr. Montgomery has changed his position and retired. 
The present case is an incident where the trial court 
overturned a stipulated and court approved modification to a 
divorce decree. It is inconceivable that Mr. Montgomery could have 
misrepresented anything to his ex-wife. The simple fact is they 
did not speak. The parties both had the same employer namely Hill 
Air Force Base. Mrs. Snitchler went through the same retirement 
process herself just before she signed the government's standard 
form for spousal consent to the partial lump sum distribution. She 
knew the people in personnel. She had gotten the forms necessary 
to get her own retirement benefits. How could the trial court find 
Montgomery misrepresented anything to her? 
But even if something Mr. Montgomery said could be construed 
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to be a misrepresentation the Office of Personnel Management did 
not accept the simple signature without a new qualified domestic 
relations order replacing the one they had on file. 
Mrs. Snitchler made an intelligent decision based on 
considerations such as her health and that of her ex-husband as to 
whether she should take a substantial lump sum payment now or wait 
for possibly ten years to begin receiving a monthly payment. She 
chose the immediacy of the lump sum in consultation with her 
attorney. She induced Mr. Montgomery to retire. 
Mr. Montgomery radically changed his position by leaving his 
employment and retiring. He did so on the basis of the promises 
made by his ex in the stipulation and in reliance on the court's 
order made pursuant to the stipulation. Mr. Montgomery would not 
have retired but for his ex-wife's promises. 
Mr. Montgomery's position is forever altered to his detriment 
by Judge Cornaby's modification. He can not go back to work but 
is stuck in living on an income that does not meet his needs 
because of the court altering a stipulation that was negotiated at 
arms length and in good faith. 
It appears that the court was determined to reach a result the 
law would not allow and therefore found a misrepresentation. There 
is simply no evidence of a misrepresentation. Equity requires that 
Mr. Montgomery be restored to the benefit of his bargain. The cost 
to him of upholding the trial court's decision is simply too great. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no change of circumstance to justify a modification 
of the decree. To change a negotiated arms length counsel 
negotiated order there must be a compelling reason. 
There was no misrepresentation. A misrepresentation implies 
an act or statement made to mislead or some how deceive. In this 
case the record is barren of any such allegations. 
Mr. Montgomery desires the court to reverse the trial court 
and restore the negotiated Qualified Domestic Relations Order to 
force and effect and allow him to pay his ex-wife the percentage of 
the lump sum the two of them bargained for. 
Dated this 22 day of May, 1992. 
Donald Cl Hilghe 
Attorney for Deffen&afiit/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES, that they have caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the 
following person(s), by placing same in the United States Postal 
Service, postage pre-paid, May 22, 1992: 
Brian Florence 
818 26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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APPENDIX 
VYC navy since oeen able to correct that. They have 
2 returned those amounts to Mr. Montgomery. 
3 THE COURT: What amounts? 
4 MR. HUGHES: The amounts they were taking. They were 
5 collecting out of his monthly retirement. They were taking 
6 approximately about, I guess, almost a third of his monthly 
7 retirement to pay back that lump sum amount. He has since 
8 had that restored, I think as of December. 
9 We're in a position to pay her the $8100 
10 immediately, and he can do that and is proposed to do that. 
11 THE COURT: Out of money he's got, you mean? 
12 MR. HUGHES: Right; which would represent the amount of 
13 her percentage of the lump sum share that she was to receive. 
14 He has the ability now to pay that. That's been resolved. 
15 So that's what we're going to present, your Honor, 
16 that these people negotiated a result that achieved that 
17 result, and both, Mr. Montgomery in particular, radically 
18 modified his position where he can't go back to where things 
19 were before. And we're asking the Court to just — they're 
20 stuck with the agreement they've entered into. 
21 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Florence, I understand when you 
22 filed this, there was the claim being made that they weren't 
23 going to pay anything to your client. 
24 I MR. FLORENCE: That's correct. 
25 I THE COURT: And your client's now taking the position 
D\t[[ij !Bioivn ^HiciUn Court Reporter 
2 MR. FLORENCE: Well, no. She does not want the 8100. 
3 She made an agreement to settle for the lump sum agreement. 
4 But when she made that agreement, she was under the 
5 impression that neither he nor she if he elected to take the 
6 lump sum payment would be entitled to an additional monthly 
7 annuity retirement payment beyond that. She knowingly made 
8 that election. 
9 But after she made the election and after she could 
10 not get her $8100, it was then that she discovered not only 
11 did he get his portion of the lump sum retirement but he is 
12 also getting a monthly annuity, something that she did not 
13 believe was possible when she made the agreement in the first 
14 place. Had she known that was the case, she would not have 
15 made the agreement that she did. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Call your first witness. 
17 MR. FLORENCE: Thank you. I call Mr. Kunz. 
18 PAUL T. KUNZ, 
19 called as a witness at the request of Plaintiff, 
20 having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
21 testified as follows: 
22 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. FLORENCE: 
24 Q Would you state your name and give a business 
25 address, please. 
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, ^^^wv. ^ w , Z.UUJ w c i s n i n g t o n B o u l e v a r d , 
2 Ogden, Utah. 
3 Q And you are a lawyer licensed to practice law in 
4 the state of Utah? 
5 A I am, 
6 Q And have been for many years? 
7 A Yes. For 35 years. 
8 Q Mr. Kunz, did you in the course of your profession 
9 have an occasion to meet with and advise Hilde B. Montgomery 
10 Snitchler? 
11 A Yes, I did. 
12 Q And did that occur sometime during the middle of 
13 1990? 
14 A Yes. I believe she first called me in August of 
15 1990, and we met, I believe, the first time in regard to the 
16 matter in September of 1990. 
17 Q When she met with you, what was her concern? 
18 A She told me that her husband had agreed that when 
19 she retired from the government that she could receive a lump 
20 sum settlement, which she had received. She informed me that 
21 her husband approached her and asked her if she would consent 
22 to his taking a lump sum settlement, and that he had to take 
23 it within a certain date or that he couldn't do it. And he 
24 I said that — She said that Mr. Hughes had prepared a 
25 | stipulation in regard to the payment of the lump sum 
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1 settlement to her husband and that she wanted me to review 
2 that and see if that was in her interest to sign that or not 
3 sign it. And if she did sign it, then the order that he 
4 prepared with it would be the qualified domestic relations 
5 order that would be sent to the government and dispose of the 
6 matter. 
7 Q Did you review a stipulation for her? 
8 A Yes. I received a — Excuse m e — letter from 
9 Mr. Hughes dated September 11th, 1990. I received a document 
10 marked "Stipulation For Qualified Domestic Relations Order" 
11 bearing the date of August blank at the signature along with 
12 a qualified domestic relations order, both of them marked 
13 "original" in the event that we elected to use them. I have 
14 them here in my file. 
15 Q And in that regard, let me show you what also been 
16 marked at Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and ask you if that is the 
17 copy of the stipulation that was sent to you. 
18 A Yes. That is the copy of the stipulation that was 
19 also either sent to me or to Mrs. Snitchler. 
20 Q Was the stipulation identified as Plaintiff's 
21 Exhibit 1 ever signed by anyone? 
22 A No, this was not signed by anyone. 
23 Q Did that stipulation in addition to allowing 
24 Mr. Montgomery to receive his lump sum preserve for 
25 I Mrs. Snitchler a portion of his monthly retirement benefit? 
1 A Yes, it did. It retained whatever benefit she 
2 previously had under the prior domestic relations order and 
3 was to release only to him as I understood and read it the 
4 lump sum provision. 
5 Q Did you question the legality or permissibility of 
6 that arrangement? 
7 A Yes. I was concerned about that because it didn't 
8 appear to me that $8100 which was the proposed share of the 
9 lump sum was reasonable in relationship to the alternative of 
10 receiving a monthly benefit of $400 per month. 
11 Q What inquiry, if any, did you make concerning the 
12 permissibility of entering into the first stipulation? 
13 A Well, I told Mrs. Snitchler that I couldn't approve 
14 entering into such a stipulation unless I found out more 
15 about it. And I told her that I was not familiar with the 
16 government retirement programs, that I did understand that 
17 the employee paid in certain amounts himself as a 
18 contribution and that the government made contributions and 
19 that I would suppose that you could withdraw your own 
20 contributions, but that I wasn't certain. And before 
21 entering into any such agreement, I thought we should contact 
22 the government personnel. 
23 And at that time, I asked her the names of people 
24 she dealt with at Hill Field, and she gave me the names of 
25 some parties. And I talked to them, and I did not get any 
1 satisfaction. 
2 So I made a later appointment with her, and it was 
3 on October 12th, 1990, my telephone log shows. And I called 
4 Hill Field again and asked them for the people that I would 
5 contact to find out more information on this. And I received 
6 a telephone number for the Office of Personnel Management 
7 court order benefits section in Washington, D.C. 
8 And I called the first number and talked to a 
9 person there that did not give me any satisfaction but 
10 referred me to the second number. My log shows that I talked 
11 17 minutes to the party at the second number. And I informed 
12 that party of the Social Security numbers of the two parties 
13 which I had in the order and stipulation and the general 
14 circumstances, and that my concern was, umm, if the person 
15 consented to the lump sum distribution, would it affect the 
16 monthly retirement benefit distribution. 
17 Based on that information— And I had my phone on 
18 a speaker phone where Mrs. Snitchler could also hear this 
19 person. Based on the information that I received, I came to 
20 the conclusion that there was no alternative, that both 
21 parties either had to accept the lump sum benefit or both 
22 parties had to accept the monthly benefit, that one party 
23 could not pull out the lump sum and then the secondary party 
24 or the spouse party go on with her benefits. But it was my 


























there were no further benefits. And I inquired with the 
parties dealing with back and forth and had Mrs. Snitchler 
hear that, and was satisfied that's what they told us. 
Q And was it then based upon that understanding that 
both you and Mrs. Snitchler signed the new stipulation 
providing for a $8100 lump sum payment to her in exchange for 
any other claim to monthly payments? 
A Yeah. My recollection is that after that 
conversation, that I had a brief conversation with Mr. Hughes 
wherein I think I informed him of the information I had 
received from Washington. And that based upon that 
information, the original stipulation which he had sent me 
stating that Mr. Montgomery would receive the lump sum and it 
would not affect her monthly, that they would not go along 
with that. 
And then it's my recollection that after having 
that information, that is when the second stipulation which 
you've not presented in evidence was given to me. And then 
Mrs. Snitchler and I sat down and discussed it. And I 
explained to her that "It's my understanding that if you go 
with the lump sum, neither one of you will receive any 
monthly payments, that they make you go strictly one way or 
the other and that we don't have any alternative." 
And my recollection is she says "Well, if that is 
the case, he had consented for me to take out my lump sum. I 
1 feel that Ifm sort of honored-bound to let him do it. " 
2 But I was very concerned about exchanging $8100 
3 cash for $400 a month for so long as his retirement could 
4 continue. 
5 Q In fact, alternately a stipulation was signed, was 
6 it not? 
7 A Yes. A second stipulation was prepared by 
8 Mr. Hughes, was sent to my office. I reviewed it, and that 
9 stipulation was prepared in accordance with the information 
10 that Washington had provided me and of which information I 
11 had also informed Mr. Hughes, I believe, before that 
12 stipulation was prepared. 
13 Q Okay. Presumably that stipulation is in the file. 
14 Mr. Kunz, had you known that in addition to 
15 receiving the lump sum payment benefit Mr. Montgomery would 
16 have been entitled to go on receiving monthly retirement 
17 payments, would you have agreed to sign the stipulation along 
18 with Mrs. Snitchler? 
19 A No. I never would have recommended that she sign 
20 it because I was very disturbed and she was very disturbed. 
21 We just couldn't reconcile the mathmatics of it of 8100 as 
22 against 400 a month, you know, maybe for life. 
23 And then when she came in later and told me she 
24 hadn't received it, that's when I told her that I recommended 
25 that she see you or someone that had dealt with these orders 
1 and was maybe familiar with them. 
2 Q Thank you. 
3 I would move for admission of Exhibit 1. 
4 MR. HUGHES: No objection, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: It may be admitted. 
6 (Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was admitted.) 
7 MR. FLORENCE: I have no further questions of Mr. Kunz. 
8 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. HUGHES: 
10 Q If I understand what you've indicated to 
11 Mr. Florence, the difference between the first stipulation 
12 and the second one is the first one says that Mrs. Snitchler 
13 waives her right to anything in the lump sum but is going to 
14 get a payment as an annuity later on. And the one that was 
15 ultimately signed, she waived her rights in the annuity and 
16 takes the lump sum in the percentage. Is that the 
17 fundemental difference between the two? 
18 A That's the fundemental difference between the two. 
19 Q Let me show you what I've had marked as Defendant's 
20 Exhibit Number 1. Did your client ever show you that or 
21 indicate to you that she had previous to coming to you had 
22 entered and signed an agreement on behalf of Mr. Montgomery? 
23 A No. I have never seen the document which you 
24 present to me before. My client had told me that she had 
25 made a commitment in regard to the lump sum. 
1 A No, I didn't. After she married, I don't recall, 
2 it was right after she turned 55, she called me to sign a 
3 document to obtain her lump sum* And at that time, I think 
4 it was around '87, she says — I says "Well, if you'll sign 
5 document so I can obtain my lump sum," She said she wouldn' 
6 at that time. So I just dropped the issue. Then this early 
7 retirement come about — 
8 Q Let me before you get to that. Have you ever 
9 signed anything on her behalf? 
10 A No, I haven't. 
11 Q Do you know how she would obtain that without your 
12 signature? 
13 A I do not know. 
14 Q Did you at some point learn that if you were going 
15 to take a lump sum option that was going to terminate as of 
16 December 1st, 1990, that you had to retire before December 
17 1st? 
18 A No, never. 
19 Q No. Did you ever learn there was going to be a 
20 cutoff, the government was going to cut off as an option — 
21 A Yes. As of the 1st of December, 1990. That was 
22 the last lump sum payments they were going td authorize. 
23 Q And in 1989, did you approach Mrs. Snitchler to 
24 execute the documents to allow you to do that? 
25 A Yes. 
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page; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
MR. HUGHES: I would move for admission of Exhibit 
Number 1, your Honor. 
MR. FLORENCE: No objection. 
THE COURT: It may be admitted. 
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit 1 was admitted.) 
Q (By Mr. Hughes) Now, you heard Mr. Kunz discuss 
the negotiations that went on. Did you approach me sometime 
in July or August about changing the qualified domestic 
relations order to allow you to do the lump sum? 
A Well, yes. 
Q Okay. And why did — Why wasn't this document 
Number 1 enough? 
A O.P.M. sent back a letter and said I had to modify 
the divorce decree, existing decree, to allow it. 
Q You have had to change the domestic relations they 
had? 
A Yes. 
Q And you heard Mr. Kunz testify that the first set 
of documents sent over let you take the 400 sum — gave the 
$400 out of the other. But the one we actually signed that 
they agreed to she took her percentage of the lump sum and 
agreed to waive the rest. That was your ultimate 
understanding and agreement, wasn't it? 


























A Yes. It was always the understanding. 
Q Okay. Now, you could have worked for 10 more 
years, you say? 
A I could have worked indefinitely, actually. 
Q Now, you've explained to me a couple' times. Would 
you do that to the Court why would you have worked 10 more 
years? 
A I retired early though I was of age, and I was 
allowed 60 percent what they call — I could have worked 
until I built up to 82 percent. That would have given me 
82 percent of my total retirement at 2 percent a year, so I 
had to work another 10 or 11 years at that time. 
Q And that — 
A That's what I advised her. 
Q That between the 60 percent and the 82 percent was 
$400 a month approximately, isn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that how you calculated that, to pay her $400 a 
month and meet your living expenses, you would have to work 
that additional 10 years? 
A Yes. 
Q Was that part of your discussions with her, that 
she could get the lump sum now or she's going to have to wait 
to get anything until the 10 years run? 
A Yes, totally. The children understand. I just 
i I "Defendant." 
2 A "Defendant by agreement signed the release of said 
3 funds to the plaintiff." 
4 Q Okay. Thank you. 
5 A I agreed that she could take her 6- or 7- or 8,000. 
6 I don't know how much she got in a lump sum. 
7 Q Now, when she signed the agreement for you to get 
8 your lump sum payment, that which has been marked as the 
9 second sheet in Defendant's Exhibit 1, that was dated, was it 
10 not, on October the 10th of 1989? 
11 A October 9th actually. 
12 Q Okay. That's your signature there? 
13 A Well, the notary. She put the wrong date down. I 
14 don't know what her problem was. 
15 Q In any event, that was signed in 1989? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Now, the lump sum benefits and the amounts and the 
18 annuities that's attached to that, those weren't provided 
19 until March of 1991, were they? She couldn't have known 
20 those figures and those amounts or even that they existed in 
21 1989. 
22 A She received the same information that I did to get 
23 her retirement. 
24 Q Tell me, Mr. Montgomery, how she can sign a 
25 document in 1989 and know what's contained in a document 
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1 A Yes. We met there, and he told me that he wanted 
2 to get his lump sum if I agreed on it. Now, since I had 
3 fought for my lump sum — In fact, he didn't ever sign 
4 anything for it. And I have a stack of papers this big that 
5 I needed, umm, witnesses that he refused to sign it and so 
6 on. And I had to go through all that trouble, and I had to 
7 have that notarized. So I did get my lump sum without his 
8 signature. 
9 Q Let me show you on the document there that you've 
10 signed. I presume you got page 1 as part of the packet of 
11 materials? 
12 A No, I don't have it. And when we were at the 
13 credit union dated the 10th of October in '89, I asked them 
14 if I could have a copy of it. And the lady notary had it and 
15 was going to copy it, and he ripped it out of her hands. I 
16 don't have anything. And he would not let me have it, 
17 either. 
18 Q All right. So you're saying that since that time, 
19 you've never seen a copy of this kind of agreement? 
20 A That's right. 
21 Q All right. I won't ask you anymore questions about 
22 that one. 
23 You were ultimately informed by your ex-husband 
24 that this wasn't sufficient, weren't you, that the actual 
25 divorce decree had to have some amendments to it in order to 
1 allow him to get the lump sum? 
2 A The reason for this paper was that he could receiv 
3 his lump sum just as I, and there was no other comments. 
4 Q But ultimately you learned that that wasn't 
5 sufficient, that he couldn't get that lump sum based on that 
6 paper? 
7 A I was never concerned about it because that was 
8 supposed to be it. I agreed for him to let him have the lump 
9 sum, and that was it. 
10 Q Ultimately you went to Mr. Kunz for what reason? 
11 A Because about half a year after he had retired, I 
12 hadn't received anything. And I was told when I called 
13 Washington that he had received half of his lump sum. And, 
14 umm, during — 
15 Q I don't want to get ahead. 
16 A During the conversation, it came out that he wasn't 
17 entitled to any lump sum since I was having a claim on his 
18 retirement. 
19 Q Let's take it a step at a time. He retired in 
20 November of 1990? 
21 A '90. 
22 Q I'm asking you about events when you went to see 
23 Mr. Kunz in July or August of 1990. Do you remember that? 
24 I A Uh~huh (affirmative). 



























Q Were you informed or had there had to be some sort 
of agreement between you and Mr. Montgomery that the judge 
would sign allowing the government to deal with the 
retirement? Do you remember that? 
A No. I was told that since he had already received 
half of the lump sum, I could not automatically go back to 
the $400 a month. 
Q We're talking about before he retired. We're 
talking about before while he's still working, before he 
received anything back in August of 1990. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Do you remember me mailing you some documents and 
asking you to sign that? 
A Yes. 
All right. And you took those to Mr. Kunz; is that 
correct? 
Yes 
Q And in those, then, do you remember ultimately 
signing one of those documents that Mr. Kunz and I exchanged? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Let me show you a copy of what's in the file. The 
first paragraph there, it makes a statement that this is an 
attempt to resolve all of the retirement issues that exist 
between you and Mr. Montgomery, doesn't it? 
can i Mick zn Court Reporter 
1 A Yes, 
2 Q And that's what you were negotiating with your 
3 ex-husband, wasn't it, a way of getting out of each other's 
4 way permanently and forever, that neither one of you were 
5 going to come back again? This is the end of everything. 
6 The two of you are going to do this agreement. You get your 
7 rights. He gets his, and then you're done. That's what it 
8 says, this document? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q On the next page over there, it indicates that 
11 you're going to get the lump sum of 27 percent or 
12 approximately $8100 we calculated, but whatever 27 percent 
13 comes out. And then it says that's all you get, that you 
14 waive any future right to any annuities or any other claims 
15 on his benefits of any kind. That's what it says in that 
16 document, doesn't it? 
17 A Yes; because all we knew was there was $30,000, and 
18 we didn't know anything more than that. 
19 Q Did Mr. Montgomery tell you if you weren't willing 
20 to do the lump sum, he was probably going to have to work 
21 another 10 years to make his lifestyle to meet with what he 
22 should be? 
23 A He mention — He never mentioned 10 years, but he 
24 said he would have to work a long time. 
25 Q But you were aware considering this document that 
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1 A Yes; because he wanted his lump sum. 
2 MR. HUGHES: That's all I have of her, your Honor. 
3 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. FLORENCE: 
5 Q Mrs. Snitchler, have you received any retirement 
6 benefits by reason of your ex-husband's employment at Hill 
7 Air Force Base? 
8 A No. 
9 Q Haven't received monthly payments or any lump sum 
10 payments; is that correct? 
11 A No. 
12 Q When he had you sign that paper on October 10th of 
13 1989 agreeing to allow him to take the lump sum payment, did 
14 you know that in addition to that, he would be receiving 
15 approximately $1700 per month as a retirement benefit? 
16 A No, I didn't. 
17 Q Had you known that, would you have signed an 
18 agreement waiving any monthly annuity? 
19 A Absolutely not. 
20 Q When he had you sign that document, the document on 
21 October 10th, 1989, was this attached to it, any document 
22 that explained the alternative annuities and what he would 
23 get if he didn't take a lump sum or what he would get if he 
24 did take a lump sum? 



























A I didn't get to see it. He held it down so I coul 
sign it, and I never did get a copy or anything. 
Q Thank you. 
That's all. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HUGHES 
Q You indicated that you did make a complaint to 
O.P.M. in Washington, is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And that's what instigated Mr. Montgomery having t 
pay back a part of the claim on his lump sum, wasn't it? 
A I don't know anything about that. But if he has t 
repay it or anything, that's possibly true. I don't know. 
Q You don't want the $8100 now? 
A I would like to go back to my $400 a month. 
MR. HUGHES: That's all I have, your Honor; 
MR. FLORENCE: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. HUGHES: We have nothing further, your Honor. 
MR. FLORENCE: Can I argue it just very briefly, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. FLORENCE: When these folks were divorced, the 
divorce decree said the plaintiff, that is, Mrs. Snitchler 
1 informed that it was not legal, that you couldn't do both. 
2 Mr. Hughes contends those were the two proposals that were 
3 available to them. 
4 If you look at Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, even if she 
5 would have accepted that, she would have been better off than 
6 they're trying to make her today. That would have preserved 
7 for her one-half of 55 percent of his retirement benefit. If 
8 we use these figures, he is getting 1776 per month. She is 
9 entitled to one-half of 55 percent or 27 1/2 percent of $1776 
10 which is in excess of $400 per month. It is closer to $500 
11 per month. 
12 If she would have accepted that, believing that she 
13 could have, she would be better off now with that proposal 
14 than just walking away with $8100. That's better than $8100. 
15 They didn't because they were informed that it was illegal. 
16 Couldn't be done. And based upon that, she elected the 
17 other. 
18 We submit that the recalculations must be done. 
19 It's too bad that Mr. Montgomery has made that sacrifice, but 
20 she has made it, as well. She can't be expected to sacrifice 
21 all those years of marriage now just because of his 
22 sacrifices, as well. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. 
24 By way of asking a question on Defendant's 
25 Exhibit 1, page 3 at the top, Option A, I take it what that 


























means, counsel, is that he would have received $1,914 if he 
had not filed for the alternative annuity; is that correct? 
MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes. There's a reduced annuity, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: That's what I say. In other words, as it 
is, he gets $138 less a month for the right to take $30,000 
in cash? 
MR. HUGHES: Right. 
MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes. 
THE COURT: The Court will make the following findings 
and decision in this matter: 
And as I am doing so, I won't repeat everything 
that's been done in the file. We recognize there was a 
divorce in 1985. We recognize that the plaintiff was to 
receive some of defendant's retirement based on the Woodward 
Formula. We recognize that there is a modification that's 
dated January the 8th of 1986, wherein, that was stated to be 
$400 per month. We have the November 15th, 1990, document 
entitled "Stipulation For Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order." I also have plaintiff's exhibit from this hearing 
today which is the first proposal that was apparently 
recently given to her. it's unsigned but bears a blank date 
of August 1990, and that's during the negotiations between 
she and her attorney Paul Kunz. 
Apparently, there was some kind of an agreement 
'LKdlu H> M. . P 
^^V-J-C© undc was made in 1989, apparently October 
2 10th, wherein, they each agreed to cash out their retirement 
3 and take a lump sum payment. Page 3 — Page 2 of that 
4 document, it's listed as Number 3 at the top, but it actually 
5 is the second page of Defendant's Exhibit 1, talks about the 
6 alternative annuity. And under Option 2, it says ' "Alternate 
7 Annuity With Lump Sum Payment." "Monthly to you" is blank. 
8 In fact, the whole document is blank. The only thing that's 
9 there, of course, is the signatures. By those signatures, 
10 Mrs. Snitchler was agreeing "I freely consent to this 
11 alternative annuity election including the level of survivor 
12 benefits shown above." And, of course, there are no survivor 
13 benefits shown above. They're all left blank. 
14 So the only thing she was agreeing to at that time 
15 according to this document was the alternative election which 
16 meant, as we then look at the third page of that same 
17 document, it meant monthly if you exercise the regular 
18 annuity Option 1A, it sent $1914 a month to the defendant and 
19 nothing to the survivor. 
20 Going down to Option 2, "Alternative Annuity With 
21 Lump Sum Payment" which is what he apparently currently is 
22 receiving $1,776 per month with a lump sum entitlement of 
23 $29,774.17. 
24 The Court recognizes that the plaintiff in signing 
25 the stipulation in the file that was actually dated November 
^KMij UBioism cHicktn Court Reporter 4 8 
1 I 2nd, 1990, did so expecting to receive as the stipulation 
2 provided a certain amount from each of those as payments were 
3 made. 
4 The facts have shown that the defendant received 
5 $17,000 and kept the entire amount, that the plaintiff never 
6 received anything under it. That when inquiries were finally 
7 made, she then became aware that the annuity, the Option 2 
8 alternative annuity, was the $29,774 plus $1776 per month. 
9 Now, her former counsel has been before the Court 
10 and testified, and he's testified that both he and she 
11 understood that the lump sum settlement was the entire 
12 benefit the defendant was to receive and that they had agreed 
13 to abide by that, which was the 30,000, and she would get 
14 $8100 of it. 
15 And I think in that process, the defendant 
16 deliberately misrepresented to both — to the plaintiff what 
17 the benefit was, and never at any time was it conveyed to the 
18 plaintiff what the actual entitlement was, that is, that 
19 there was a lump sum payment of the 29,774 plus the $1776 per 
20 month. Apparently that's not even determined until 
21 March 14th, 1991, when Mr. Montgomery signs the document at 
22 that time agreeing that that's what he is to receive. 
23 And I recognize that there is some unfairness in 
24 the way I'm ruling to the defendant because he did make a 
25 decision to retire early based on the agreement of the 
D\zilu !B%OLvn ^Micktn Court Renortpr 
1 I plaintiff. And I don't believe that she can have both the 
2 $8500 and the $400 per month. And he did retire early. But 
3 I think she is entitled to and to have the stipulation set 
4 aside because of the misrepresentation. And as I do so, it's 
5 always hesitating when we set aside a stipulation because 
6 they ought to be upheld whenever possible. But under these 
7 circumstances, it can't be, meaning I can't. 
8 So I think she is entitled to the entire amount of 
9 his lump sum retirement, and she's entitled to what she 
10 bargained for which was a certain percentage of his 
11 retirement, 27 percent of his retirement. And his retirement 
12 is 1776, and she ought to be willing to settle for that. I 
13 think the figure is 27 percent of that amount per month. 
14 And, of course, that has to begin with the month of 
15 December 1990 since that was when the retirement was. 
16 That will be the order of the Court. Defendant 
17 will draw the order. Any questions? 
18 MR. FLORENCE: The only question I have, your Honor, I'm 
19 sure it will take some time to notify the retirement office 
20 so that they can begin sending her share directly. We would 
21 ask that Mr. Montgomery be required to reimburse her for the 
22 months of December of '90 through such time as that becomes 
23 effective, however many months. 
24 THE COURT: That is implied in the order. 
25 MR. FLORENCE: Thank you. 
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z I as to the back amounts, how it's going to be paid at this 
3 time, but it certainly is on an ongoing basis in the meantime 
4 of $400 per month ought to be paid by him beginning with this 
5 month, 
6 MR. FLORENCE: Thank you. 
7 MR. HUGHES: My understanding of it it's the 
8 misrepresentations? 
9 THE COURT: That's the basis for my ruling, yes. 
10 MR. HUGHES: And he got the lump sum in July and was 
11 jumped on by O.P.M. in August. And this action — present 
12 action was filed a few days after he got the notice from 
13 O.P.M. So we only have that lump sum amount for a matter of 
14 a week or so before she was refusing to take it. And from 
15 then until here today that she take that? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. I haven't found that, but I suppose 
17 that's a factual matter that's there. 
18 MR. HUGHES: The misrepresentation will be that he 
19 didn't explain to her — 
20 THE COURT: The misrepresentation goes clear back to the 
21 time on October 10th of 1990 when they were signing the 
22 agreement where the representation was that the total 
23 retirement was $29,774. And that was a total lump sum 
24 settlement. And so she had a 20 — in effect, a certain 
25 percentage of that. And that was a misrepresentation. 
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All right. That's all. 
MR. FLORENCE: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.) 
* * * * * 
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